We realize that Turkey would view its role in this Crisis as a balancing force against Iran’s several years of engagement in the region. Yet, that still fails to justify, in any rational way, the dramatic shift in nearly a century-long fundamental founding policy of the Republic regarding respect and non-intervention in neighbours’ internal affairs. With this issue of Reflections TURKEY, we look at the Syrian Question from several angles to get a sound and realistic understanding of the policy issues involved.

Reflections TURKEY, in its December 2012 issue, is also addressing a number of fundamental social and economic issues that underlie political developments in the country. We believe the EU accession process that has been recently comprimised to regional and local political agenda should still constitute one of the main, long-term pillars of the country’s quest for development and prosperity. Therefore, we shall keep our focus on the methods and instruments to be employed in the resolution of the financial and economic bottlenecks in Eurozone and their implications on issues of employment, new investments, budgetary discipline, growth and development in Turkey.

Last but not the least, we at Reflections TURKEY are preparing to take our publication to a new institutional platform that would expand our reach to a wider community of academic people and policy professionals. We believe systematic contributions by a panel of distinguished professionals would enrich and enhance the outcome of our work here. We also believe that the new institutional framework of Reflections TURKEY would serve a more effective and comprehensive medium to convey to the reader a sound selection of alternative perspectives on Turkish affairs in his/her understanding of the developments in the country and the region in general. We shall be keeping you posted on the next steps regarding our new organization in the weeks ahead.

Turkish Government has taken sides with the rebel forces in Syria while completely shutting off all channels of communications with the Esad Administration.

The government, having to address these issues in some meaningful manner has, once again, chosen to respond to them in the usual way it has always done in such crisis periods before; through diverting the focus of the public to superficiality, i.e. to issue areas that invoke momentarily widespread public attention with no real or relevant substance. We have seen this happen in the foreign policy sphere. We have seen it happen in the economic sphere; we have also seen it happen in the political and social spheres. at the present, the administration appears to be juggling with the critical policy needs in the country instead of addressing them directly with clear and cohesive response mechanisms.

The Syrian Policy appears to reflect a dire judgement error in the many respects. The political arm of the current administration in Turkey has dramatically altered the long-standing foreign policy strategy of the Republic regarding the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of its neighbours. The government has taken sides with the rebel forces in Syria while completely shutting off all channels of communications with the Esad Administration. This has been a failed bet on the part of the Turkish government as the government officially committed itself to the unseating of the Syrian regime within “two months” in a statement that was made over a year ago. This was clearly a misreading of the indigenious dynamics of the conflict in Syria. The secular nature was Arab nationalism as manifested in the Baas system in Syria has been fundamentally different than those cases in Iraq, Libya or Egypt.

The belligerent position of Turkey and its overt support for the rebel forces may have prolonged the conflict in Syria, has definitely made it more costly for all parties involved to resolve it and has engraved such deep suspicions between two neighbouring peoples that shall last several years to come before anybody can overcome them in any real meaningful way in the future. As such, Turkey, instead of assuming a leadership role in intermediating a certain political strife in Syria in its early stages, has now seemed to have lost any chance of serving the role of a facilitator for peace. The superficial reading of the conflict in Syria along simple religious secterian lines by the Turkish government and the expectation that the West would be quick to engage in this conflict along with its ally in the East seems to have failed at the moment. Moreover, such superficiality seems to have set Turkey on course to becoming a spectator to the “Balkanization” of the region and, worse; even getting drawn into this dangerous process itself.

The government has always been fully of the trade-off between economic growth and the current account deficit. It has also been adamantly in favor of economic growth as the insurance policy for its grip of political power against all other factors.

Another policy area that the government has faced a critical test of sincerity in the recent months has been related to the question of the ethnic question in Turkey, namely the Kurdish issue. The political pressures on this issue have heightened at the parliamentary level. Social strife, especially in Eastern provinces, has also deepened in the recent weeks. Finally the news of several detainees with relation to ethnic and political acts of unlawful nature, reportedly going on hunder strikes in several prisons in the country altered the political scene dramatically. Hunger strikes of this magnitute and of this political context have aroused significant public concern on both negative and positive sides of this already politically very divisive issue. Social polarization started to increase and took on a very grave characteristic. The response of the government? Prime Minister Erdoğan and some of the government ministers went public and opened the possibility of re-instituting capital punishment in the Turkish penal code.

Assuming capital punishment is re-instituted, this would have no effect on the past cases, especially on the position of the PKK leader who is in prison for life.

However, the debate on capital punishment has extended all the way to Indonesia where the Prime Minister addressed the Conference of Islamic States in Bali, making reference to the penal codes in the U.S., Russia, China and Japan and arguing that the discussions on this topic were well justified and relevant. The debate, as superficial as it was from the beginning, ended up with the statement by the Ministery of Justice that they had no preparations to propose the reinstatement of capital punishment. Heanwhile, the imprisoned leader of PKK had asked the hunger strikers to terminate their actions which they promptly adhered, positioning him as the “counterparty” to the Government to negotiate the political demands of the Kurdish movement. At the present, the superficial response mechanism against a politically determined and disciplined organization appears to have provided an even-handed position for a terror-driven movement whose legitimacy for the democratic representation of the people in Eastern provinces itself remains a question that is yet to be cleared.

A third area of vital developments for the country involves the state of the economy and the direction it is taking into the months ahead. The most critical question in the economic front has been the question of current account deficit in the recent years. Turkey, in the last decade, has persistently run a current deficit whereby imports of goods and services well exceeded that of export steadily and consistently. Turkey, on the other hand, has successfully financed its current account deficit, though not through FDI at the desired extent, but through portfolio invesments and borrowings at increasingly better terms. The ability of the country to finance its current account deficit comfortably has resulted in high rates of economic growth while appreciating the value of its national currency. Several domestic and international observers of the Turkish economy have pointed insistently that the current account deficit of the country constituted the main fault-line of the economy and that growth became dependent on the ability of the government to sustain outside financing at a certain steady level.

The government has always been fully of the trade-off between economic growth and the current account deficit. It has also been adamantly in favor of economic growth as the insurance policy for its grip of political power against all other factors. So what is the response mechanism to the need to grapple with the current account deficit? Exports of imported gold to Iran and to the Gulf much as a flow management operation over foreign exchange transactions to report acceptable levels of current account deficits. As superficial as this response mechanism is, we expect the import bill to hike with the increase in energy related imports in the winter and the real effects of slow-down in economic growth start surfacing in the first and second quarters of the coming year.

On a more apprensive note, one can also characterize this development as the “jamming up” of Turkish politics where policy-makers, politics are rapidly running out of alternatives.

AKP and MHP held their party congresses in the past months where the leadership positions did not change but the leadership teams changed considerably. We have seen in both congresses that the rhetoric that was displayed by both leaders indicated that both parties would refrain from taking dramatically new positions on the fundamental issues of the country in the coming months. We see that both would prefer to recede back to their traditional policy positions regarding concrete issues of the ethnic question and the liberalization of religious orientation of the population at large. Hence we see the first examples of introduction of direct religious education in the school system at all level from pre-school to the military schools. Hence is the talk of some of the government ministers for the re-openning of private centers of religious training and education which were banned with the declaration of the Republic. On the other front, hence is the ultra-nationalist demands and declarations by the MHP in support of reinstatement of capital punishment, expanded military operations in Eastern provinces and in Northern Iraq to eradicate terrorist activity. Finally, hence is the opposition of the MHP against the administrative reform package to strengthen the policy making and execution mandate of the local governments.

As such, we see that the country has been polarizing along the axis of a more religiously oriented society and a more ethnically divided and defined social landscape. On a more apprensive note, one can also characterize this development as the “jamming up” of Turkish politics where policy-makers, politics are rapidly running out of alternatives. As a result, the country may be sliding towards potentially the most destructive and costly political show-down in the history of the Republic. Meanwhile, engaging in a military conflict along the southern borders remains as a real possibility, exacerbating the challenges ahead. Financial, political, human and social costs of these challenges stand at such critically high levels at the moment and increasing by the day that they not only threaten the very foundations of the Republic but posing a threat to peace and stability in the region. We argue that deployment of superficial response mechanisms, public relations ploys, to tackle the mounting political, economic, social and security related issues in the country should be abonded immediately.

Furthermore, we argue that such personalized approaches be replaced by sound and structural response models, knowledge-based, realistic mechanisms that ensure stable and sustainable outcomes in line with the merits of the problems faced and to be faced in the future in the region.

Unfortunately, Europe provides us with plenty of examples proving this statement. One should just recall “POE” to easily keep in mind the mentioned fact. Without defaming the respectable memory of Edgar Allan Poe, the famous American author and poet, we use “POE” to recall the names of three contemporary authoritarian politicians: Putin, Orban, and Erdoğan.

These three personalities display common peculiarities. All have been elected in their respective countries by 50 percent of the votes or more. They all dominate countries that have never really been acquainted with genuine democracy, giving rise to a sort of “majority cult.” All three are intending to keep power for a long period of time, enough time to completely transform their societies in a conservative way, while also settling the structures of a completely liberal economy. What’s more, they are all ready to overstep democratic limits for the realization of their purpose.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is presently putting his priority on his own personal career as the “future president of Turkey.” In this, he is trying to make the necessary legal changes in order to transform the current parliamentary democracy into a presidential system. He is not content with the constitutional possibilities ensured by a parliamentary democracy, but wants more and more.

After having presumably settled the constitutional frame of a presidential system, Erdo€an will rely on an absolute majority. Facing the determined opposition of left-oriented voters, secularists and progressives, he needs to rally the nationalist, rightist and reactionary electorate, which tends toward the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Erdoğan does not hesitate, for his personal political ambition, to attempt to restore capital punishment, keeping in mind the electorate that has long sought the execution of Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who was captured and imprisoned in 1999. Erdoğan does not seem to be concerned about Turkey’s commitments toward the EU, for which it has been declared an “accession candidate.”

Meanwhile, municipal territories have recently been readjusted over one night in parliament, in conformity with Erdoğan’s command. This was done in such a way that AKP will win more municipalities with the same share of the vote nationwide. Nowadays every single AKP member of parliament or AKP delegate is aimed at paving Erdoğan’s path to the presidency.

When it comes to AKP’s efforts to transform Turkey into a deeply conservative, Islamic country, one may also mention the upside down change to the current educational system. The related laws to achieving this were also passed over one night without parliamentary deliberation. The opposition was physically kept away and had no opportunity to take part in the process. In “Democratic Establishments: A Dimensional Analysis,” well-known Italian political scientist Leonardo Morlino asserts that a democracy presupposes the existence of the opposition and of common consent, according to which conflicts of interest do not always come out in favor of the same groups (i.e. of the majority). “Democracy” is a system that produces a political environment of definiteness, but the decisions that are taken in such an atmosphere should not be definite and known in advance. AKP’s Turkey displays an example to the contrary.

Setting up the AKP’s rule necessarily involves the depreciation and denigration of the settled republican values. Thus, citizens eager to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation of the Republic, or those willing to commemorate the anniversary of Atatürk’s death, have recently been violently blocked by the police.

There is no need to mention AKP’s long and successful efforts leading to the submission of the judiciary to the executive. Worldwide public opinion is aware of the situation, as well as of the existence of numerous journalists jailed only because of their journalistic activities.

Turkish democrats feel frustrated, because AKP was backed by Turkey’s western allies over the past decade. In actual fact, Erdoğan considers democracy to be simply a means of transportation and, according to his own statement, one can “get off after arrival at the destination.” Indeed, Turkey is set to arrive at this envisioned destination. 

Even though the ruling party’s position on Syria has been problematic and dangerous, various fragments within the Turkish left have also made serious mistakes during the crisis.

In order to assess the situation, we shall first give a look at the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s position on the issue. Turkey has long claimed to have a foreign policy of “zero problems with neighbors.” In this light, when Syria began cracking down on its opposition last year, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attempted to maintain good ties with Bashar al-Assad’s regime, long after it was clear that he was brutally oppressing his own people. Ankara’s sudden change of position to oppose al-Assad appeared to be based more on worries about being on the wrong side of history than on genuine humanitarian concerns. Along the way, the AKP government’s flip-flopping on the issue alienated neighbors on both sides of the conflict – among them Israel, Iran, Iraq and Russia.

The miscalculation of the government is reflected in public opinion, which is running firmly against the idea of such an intervention. On the Syrian side, the formation of a new rebel umbrella group in Cairo instead of Istanbul suggests that opposition figures are skeptical of the self-proclaimed mediator role that Turkey has adopted. In short, Syria has become the worst failure of the “zero problems” thinking embodied in the policy doctrine of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.

Even though the ruling party’s position on Syria has been problematic and dangerous, various fragments within the Turkish left have also made serious mistakes during the crisis. Some in these leftist circles have claimed that the conflict in Syria was fueled by Western powers, especially the U.S., and have attempted to portray al-Assad as a legitimate leader fulfilling his responsibility to protect his nation from internal traitors.

This ill-formulated line of thinking is a product of long-term and chronic anti-U.S. sentiments among the Turkish left. Al-Assad’s mistreatment of his people is real, even if the Turkish government originally chose to overlook it. And amid the upheaval of the Arab Spring, the spreading of the revolutionary atmosphere to Syria was a natural progression of events. But Turkey’s left wing failed to see the legitimate causes of the conflict, preferring to fall back on the comfortable ground of conspiracy theory.

This superficial approach strengthened the hand of the AKP in its turnabout to assume the role of the “friend” of the Syrian people. The left’s refusal to recognize the real dimensions of the crisis polarized the thinking about Syria within Turkey, giving the government opportunity to implement overly drastic, interventionist steps such as supporting armed Syrian opposition groups.

The left’s stance is also a reflection of the isolationist approach it has adopted in foreign policy. Some, even as they concede the scope of the humanitarian crisis, have argued against any Turkish involvement whatsoever, diplomatic or otherwise. The government, meanwhile, has already given the green light to a military intervention via a bill that was passed in parliament in October. But sending troops to the Syrian battlefield would be a mistake with dire consequences for Turkey and the region, and it’s not even certain whether such an intervention would solve the crisis. However, diplomatic intervention and humanitarian assistance to refugees are a different matter and worthy of support. The Turkish left should have been a staunch supporter of Turkey welcoming displaced refugees, as the main tenants of leftist ideology would require.

A third factor is the Turkish left’s misunderstanding of the international community’s aims in getting involved in Syria. In particular, many have made the wrong assumptions about the U.S.’s role in the conflict. Washington is neither looking to play an active role nor to encourage Turkey to lead a military operation. Escalating the Syria conflict would likely set off a chain reaction in the Middle East, at a time when the U.S. is intent on drawing down its presence there for two reasons. First, Washington simply must cut back on military spending amid its debt woes, and second, U.S. strategists would like to shift the focus to the Asia-Pacific region. However, the Middle East seems like a tight boot the U.S. cannot remove from its foot.

It is safe to say that the U.S. is worried about the Turkish government’s hawkish position on Syria, fearing a potential bilateral military conflict. And since the U.S. election on Nov. 6, it has become clear that the Obama administration will not significantly change its position on Syria in its second term. Rather, Turkish policymakers should take seriously the White House’s repeatedly stated policy of relying on Middle Eastern allies to police their own region. It would be a dire mistake to make foreign policy choices based on the assumption that the U.S. would offer military support.

On Nov. 14, in his first news conference after reelection, President Obama reiterated the U.S. government’s concerns about arming the rebels, a strategy which could result in weapons ending up in the hands of extremists who want to do harm to U.S. national security interests in the region. The AKP government, meanwhile, remains eager to try more aggressive and militarily interventionist solutions, without properly assessing the potential consequences of such actions.

Instead of blaming Washington for pushing Ankara into the Syrian conflict, the Turkish left should have recognized that the opposite is true, and criticized the AKP for trying to pull a superpower into a regional conflict. Accusing the government of warmongering would be a more efficient and convincing strategy.

But Turkey’s left wing failed to see the legitimate causes of the conflict, preferring to fall back on the comfortable ground of conspiracy theory.

Key to the success of a new Syria policy direction will be the role of other regional powers, namely Russia, which along with Iran has been a firm supporter of the al-Assad regime throughout the crisis. Russia, like China, has not played a constructive role so far in the crisis and a shift on the part of Moscow could break the Syrian stalemate. Turkey’s strong economic and political relationship with Russia puts the country in a key position in this regard; for example, Ankara might find a bargaining chip in its close energy ties with Moscow. However, the AKP government was among the first to give up on diplomacy, not even making a serious attempt at talks with Russia to dissuade it from its support for the al-Assad regime. With President Vladimir Putin assuming an increasingly hostile position toward the western world since returning to the presidency, opening up a negotiating front with Russia to end the crisis would offer a historic opportunity for Turkey to live up to the regional leadership it has claimed. The Turkish left should be emphasizing the message that the government, despite its assertions, has not exhausted all the diplomatic options yet.

Turkey’s main opposition party, CHP, has set a brave and proactive vision on the Syrian issue, and became the most efficient opposition mechanism despite a slow start in the earlier stages of the crisis. CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaro€lu, writing recently in The Wall Street Journal, clearly asserted the party views al-Assad as a brutal dictator who has no place in the future of Syria, and that the refugee problem should not be used to polarize the Turkish population. His opposition to the idea of arming the Syrian rebels, in line with the U.S. position on the issue, was a brave and decisive move. He also urged a refreshed approach to diplomacy to resolve the conflict. Despite the cacophony coming from various segments of the Turkish left, CHP remains its leading representative, and its matured Syrian policy provides a good blueprint for what the Turkish government should implement.

This should open up an opportunity for the Turkish left to take a principled and coherent stand. The left’s problem until now has been that it lacks a coherent set of economic and foreign policy beliefs. The Syria crisis has demonstrated the need for a new foreign policy, based on universal enlightenment principles and Turkey’s indigenous identity, to promote cooperation and democracy. The goal should be to strike a balance between the isolationist approach of the previous few decades and the AKP’s more recent aggressive approach, which has proven to be nothing more than rhetoric. Turkey has the capability to help end the misery of its Syrian neighbors. It would be a crying shame if bad policy stopped the country from rising to the occasion.

The main reasons for this interest were as follows:

• After 9/11, the U.S. was no longer said to be the preferred destination for Arab investment, as the U.S. was intensifying security on Arabs. Thus, investors from the region looked for alternative venues.

• Turkey, governed by a party with Islamic roots, was perceived as an ally not just politically but also economically and socially.

• Turkey’s standing on Israel during the second term of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) had a very positive impact on the Arab street.

• Due to public diplomacy tools (mainly through Turkish soap operas), Turkey is understood as a role model and became a popular destination for Arab elites and the middle class.

• Since the AKP came to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy has been oriented toward intensifying economic cooperation with the Middle East and increasing Turkish interests in the region. This orientation was largely deepened during the second half of the AKP’s first term, starting in 2005, for the following reasons.

• The Turkish economy needed hot money, and the Middle East was the correct address for this.

• AKP emphasized religious solidarity with the region, especially after the momentum for European Union accession was lost.

• Current foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s influence has increased as the chief advisor to the prime minister.

Principled foreign policy vs. pragmatism

However, while this positive environment continues for Turkey in the Middle East, with the start of the Arab Spring almost two years ago Turkey was faced with a dilemma: Will Turkish foreign policy back up authoritarian regimes like the relationship established with Libya, or would it hear the demands for change that had support in the societies where these events were taking place?

In the case of Libya, the prime minister – upon receiving the Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights – claimed that NATO intervention in Libya was unacceptable while the U.S. and leading European countries were in favor. However, soon after, Turkey quickly reset itself to political realities once it was clear that the Qaddafi regime would fall.

On the other hand, Turkey has exhibited another form of incoherent policy in the case of Bahrain. Turkey chose to remain silent in the face of incidents in the country, which has been in the grip of political and ethnic unrest since protests started in February 2011 by groups demanding greater democracy and more representation to the majority Shia community in the Sunni-governed country.

Before the uprising in Syria began in mid-March 2011, Turkey was Syria’s leading trading partner

These two experiences are enough to show the dilemma faced by Turkish foreign policy makers. When short-term pragmatic approaches are shown to be limited, the crucial part of international relations is also lost: a principled foreign policy.

Syria: A site for the power struggle of the post-Cold War world. Why is Turkey the flagman?

While Turkey continues her journey with those sharp shifts, the “spring” has come to its border. Before the uprising in Syria began in mid-March 2011, Turkey was Syria’s leading trading partner in the last decade and cooperation between the two neighbors even widened with regular joint cabinet meetings and two joint military exercises in 2009 and 2010. However, democracy promotion against human rights violations and poor governance in Syria was not on Turkey’s agenda…

It is almost two years now since the initial demonstrations started against Bashar al-Assad, and Turkey’s clear support to the Syrian opposition has brought some costs.

Firstly, Turkey lost seven citizens after Syria shot down a Turkish Air Force jet in which two Turkish pilots died and Syrian shells hit homes in the Turkish town of Akçakale across from the Syrian border, causing the deaths of five. Secondly, there is strong evidence of Syrian support for the terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, in response to Turkey’s support to the Syrian opposition. Thirdly, it has had negative economic results for Turkey’s border region, which had developed a vivid trade environment with Syria before. What’s more, Syrian tourists also increased economic income for the region.

Furthermore, the process is also a test of the limits of Turkish foreign policy on a regional basis, as well as its capability toward Iran and Russia, the two countries that Turkey has been working hard to develop close relations with in recent years, as two thirds of Turkey’s natural gas and petroleum demand depends on these two countries.

Russia supports the al-Assad regime for two main reasons: It uses Syria as a venue in its power struggle against other global players and through Syria it confirms its presence in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean where it has no other allies. We may adopt this for Iran as well, with its presence also being a way of balancing Turkey’s regional claims. Moreover, Syria means a lot for Iran, as a Shiite Islamic Republic. Syria is ruled by a leader with a similar religious background to Iran – despite three fourths of its population being Sunni – while it also neighbors Lebanon and “long-time enemy” Israel. It is therefore a crucial ally for Iran.

The question of why Turkey is carrying the flag on the Syria question has importance here. Turkey has become recognized as a pro-Sunni country in the region not only because of its support to the Sunni-backed Syrian opposition but also because of its efforts to displace Iraq’s Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Turkey is also protecting another leader of the Sunni community in Iraq, vice president Tariq al-Hashimi, who has been sentenced to death in Iraq.

As a result, we should raise a question here: Does Turkey pragmatically use pro-Sunni identity in order to be a regional leader in the eyes of the Sunni-dominated Middle East (mainly Gulf) countries, in order to be able to catch the opportunities mentioned at the beginning of this paper? Or do these efforts only depend on its high level government officials’ religious, cultural and educational background? Or both?

Meanwhile, the Syrian government and Russia maintain that the internal turmoil in Syria is not about local forces fighting for democracy, but rather that it is conducted by a coalition of terrorists and mercenaries led by the American imperialists collaborating with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. They say that the agenda of this coalition is to overthrow a legitimate government on the verge of advancing a number of democratic reforms.

Turkish compliance with U.S. plans for Syria:

Turkey appears to be earnest in taking the lead as principle U.S. proxy to destabilize the al-Assad regime. It has been repeatedly stated and – so far not denied – that Syrian insurgents and armed men from a number of Arab countries are being ushered into Syria from Turkey.

Turkey has proposed that the creation of a buffer zone on the Syrian-Turkish border will be beneficial for the insurgents. Approval from NATO to actively intervene will constitute the next phase.

Turkey’s initial pretext for intervention had been the “absence of democracy in Syria,” which evolved into “the necessity of humanitarian assistance for a Muslim nation hampered by its government,” and finally transitioned into “Syrian mortar shells are landing on the Turkish side of the border and killing citizens.” However, the actual origin of these shells is dubious. The U.S. has proposed another pretext for the formation of a no-fly zone and/or a subsequent military intervention: The presence of chemical and biological weapons in Syria and the risk of these falling into the hands of international terrorist organizations.

Probable consequences of the turmoil in Syria:

Al-Assad’s departure may result in a regime controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, at least in the majority of the area currently governed by the present government. The Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt is not friendly with Israel and there is no reason to believe that a Muslim Brotherhood regime in Syria would be any different. Videos showing rebels executing al-Assad’s soldiers do not suggest a democratic substitute to al-Assad.

The Alawite minority (about 10 percent of the population) to which al-Assad belongs is supported by Shiite Iran, a religious orientation akin to that of the Alawites.

The rebels consist of a number of very different fractions with different agendas. Reports from many sources indicate that regiments of “Syrian freedom fighters” contain Sunni Islamists, Salafist jihadists, and al-Qaeda-style jihadists. Inter-factional strife can be expected after the fall of the al-Assad regime and Syria will most probably become fragmented. An Alawite enclave on the north-west coast may eventually be governed by al-Assad or his followers. This enclave may extend toward Aleppo and Homs, and may occupy something similar to the area previously occupied by the “Alauites State” that existed as French mandate territory from 1920 to 1936 along the shores of the Mediterranean, which extended from Hatay to Lebanon on its southern border. Latakia and Tartus are the ports of this region where the Russian naval bases and facilities are located, so the formation of such a state will secure the presence of these bases and therefore this state of affairs may be deemed acceptable by the Russians. Such a state would probably have a Baathist government and would be secular.

A Kurdish enclave may appear in the northeast along the Turkish and Iraqi border, and most of the rest may become a Sunni region governed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Probably an offshoot of Hamas or other radical Islamic groups would also present collaborating or opposing parties in this area.

Syria’s oil reserves are located mainly in the eastern part of the country in the Deir ez-Zor province, near the border with Iraq, and diverted by pipelines to the Mediterranean coast. After fragmentation, Deir ez-Zor will remain within the Syrian Kurdish enclave that will coalesce with Iraqi Kurdistan, while the Mediterranean end of the pipeline will end up in the Alawite state.

Is this a profitable end-result for the U.S. and Israel?

Yes!

Why does the U.S. want to eliminate Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria?

a.  Syria’s demise is a step towards the taming of Iran: Keeping the dollar the dominant international currency is the most important determinant of U.S. foreign policy, as moving away from the dollar toward the euro or any other currency would have a disastrous effect on the U.S. economy. This is especially valid if carried out by the major oil producers: Iraq was punished for taking such a step. Iran has been shifting its currency reserves into euros and has already sold some of its oil for euros. In addition, it has also been encouraging Asian oil importers to pay Iran in euros. Iran’s persistent anti-dollar behavior renders it an important liability to the stability of the U.S. economy. As Syria is a major ally of Iran, its demise would be a step toward the effective taming of Iran.

There is yet another important reason for speeding up the process toward the elimination of the Persian factor. Following the withdrawal of the bulk of the U.S. army from Iraq, Iran has succeeded in bringing the area under Shiite control. The regional balance of power has now shifted in favor of Shiites. Sunni regimes feel threatened and are interested in reversing the balance before it is too late.

b.  The fragmentation of Syria will result in the formation of a Kurdish state in the northeast: Such a state would eventually join up with the already-existing Iraqi Kurdistan. A larger and stronger Kurdistan would offer bases to the U.S. whenever it demanded and it would also be an important ally of Israel, which is encircled by so many hostile Arab nations.

c.  Syria has been a serious military and political threat to Israel and the U.S.:

• After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, explosions in 1983 organized by Islamic Jihad – related to Hezbollah and collaborating with the Syrian government – destroyed the U.S. embassy and marine headquarters in Beirut.
• Syria harbors part of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Both of these organizations operate against Israel.
• Syria perpetually meddles with and threatens the stability of Lebanon, using its influence on the groups siding with the al-Assad regime to upset the regional political balance against Israel and the U.S.

Is this a profitable end-result for Turkey?

No!

a.  Turkey was once benefiting economically from its rapprochement with the Syrian regime: No more! Turkish towns bordering Syria were flourishing with Syrian visitors, and exports to Syrian border towns had significantly increased. In 2010 Turkey’s annual exports to Syria came to 1.6 billion dollars, but these exports are practically at a standstill now.

Trucks loaded with Turkish products were using the Syrian highways to reach 11 countries in the Middle East. This route cannot be used now. Ro-ro naval transportation of Turkish goods to the Middle East through Egypt is more time consuming and extremely costly. Despite some support by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, over 100,000 refugees hosted and fed in Turkey are an economic burden.

b.  The formation of a Syrian Kurdish enclave may not appeal to Turkey: Such an enclave would probably coalesce with the already-existing Iraqi Kurdistan, and may eventually lead to demands for the inclusion of the Turkish region where Kurds consist the majority and to the formation of a Greater Kurdistan.

Hence, the participation in activities that would result in the disintegration of Syria is not profitable or justifiable for Turkey. As all the polls suggest, the majority of Turkish people are not in favor of getting involved in this turmoil, and so acting contrary to this choice is undemocratic!

A more profound question must also certainly be asked: If the whole deed is neither profitable nor justifiable, why does Turkey meddle?

To the best of my knowledge, anthropology is the only academic discipline that devotes an entire course to the topic of culture. Anthropology is also the only academic discipline that has a consistent difficulty in providing a concise definition of the term “culture.” Since anthropologists’ storytelling skills outperform their definitional skills, I prefer to contribute to the dialogue forum on cultural diversity and tolerance through a story of my own.

Back in my days as an academic, four works of calligraphy – what is called “Hüsn-ü Hat” in Turkey – used to adorn my office and demonstrate my intellectual path in the university. “Hoflgör Ya Hu” is a call to tolerance, compassion, and mercy. “Edep Ya Hu” is a call to proper conduct, manners, morality, and ethics. “Bu da Geçer Ya Hu” is a call to patience, perseverance, and acceptance since nothing lasts forever. “Hiç” meaning nothing and void is an existential call that neither needs nor allows the pinpointing its call.

One could easily contemplate better expressions of diversity, pluralism, and coexistence. How about embracing, encouraging, recognizing, promoting, needing, or benefiting from difference?

When we bring these four works of calligraphy together, we come quite close to the ideal of a university, as a sanctuary of diversity (Hoflgör Ya Hu), ethics (Edep Ya Hu), wisdom (Bu da Geçer Ya Hu), and transcendence (Hiç). These four mantras also seem apt for a European Union that aims to be the sanctuary of diversity among all other ideals.

Clearly, the most challenging of these four concepts is “hoflgörü,” roughly translated as tolerance, especially since the two concepts refer to quite different sentiments in English and Turkish languages. The English word “tolerate” comes from the Latin word “tolerare” meaning to bear or to endure. This obviously is quite a different sentiment in comparison to “hoflgör,” which means to see or perceive in a good or pleasant manner.

As Benjamin J. Kaplan’s brilliant study “Divided by Faith” demonstrates, the European history of tolerance, which is from another perspective the long history of inter-sectarian fighting and the failure to exterminate, subjugate or assimilate others, invokes a different set of sentiments shaped around conflict, fighting, and mass killings. This could be one of the reasons why Mehmet Aydın reminded us of Jacques Derrida’s suggestion to use the word “hospitable” instead of “tolerate.”

“Being hospitable to difference” sounds more positive than “being tolerant towards difference.” Anthropologists such as Michael Herzfeld, however, would warn you that hospitality is first and foremost a sentiment of hierarchy, setting the rules and limits governing the relations between the host and the guest. Hospitality, therefore, is an expression of power asymmetry, not necessarily a great metaphor of diversity.

One could easily contemplate better expressions of diversity, pluralism, and coexistence. How about embracing, encouraging, recognizing, promoting, needing, or benefiting from difference? These conceptualizations inevitably bring us to inter-cultural education and inter-cultural competence. I am, however, quite skeptical of the references to inter-culturality in dialogue forums like the one we are attending today, since I have seen too many a times that those who allude to inter-culturality are often quite brutish about intra-cultural difference. Needless to say, Turkey is example par excellence for this double-standard attitude.

In the end, questions about inter- or intra-culturality, are questions about authenticity, purity, borders, demarcations; in short, questions about essential and incommensurable differences. Those who are familiar with Homi Bhabha’s take on hybridity, colonial anxiety and ambivalence, or Mikhail Bakhtin’s conceptualization of polyphony and the “carnivalesque” would prefer to distance themselves from the “essentials” in the field of cultural interaction. Hybridity, creole, and mélange seem to be more appropriate framings of the emergence of a new world and its accompanying humanity, characterized first and foremost by diversity.

In this new world, would an increased amount of knowledge be the path to salvation in the university, in the media, and in the European Union? I doubt this strongly. As one of my favorite medieval polymaths, Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi, once said “a ton of science is in need of a kilo of morality.” In the footsteps of Razi’s critical take, my conclusion has to remain an inquiry: Regardless of the amount and quality of knowledge we provide to students, journalists, politicians, and Eurocrats, what are the values, morality, or ethics we should offer them to sustain and to promote cultural diversity, pluralism, and the never-ending emergence of hybrid subjects and forms that will inevitably lead to ambivalence and anxiety? Clearly, these are sentiments that human societies are not terribly comfortable with. “Comfort,” as anyone who has encountered Ian McEwan’s “The Comfort of Strangers” can attest, is a deeply problematic concept, just like “hospitality.” But that’s a long story better saved for another dialogue forum…

The AKP introduced itself as a “conservative democratic” party in the early days of its administration, but the adjective was used with a different meaning throughout the party’s first period in power. The western political system evaluated AKP as being “Muslim democrats” and considered the party in parallel to “Christian democrats” in European countries. Toward the end of the second term, until the referendum period in 2012 AKP started to challenge the political system of Turkey.

The conservative Turkish media started to label Alevi citizens ‘local Baathists,’ thus making them a target.

Alevis have always been considered an essential barrier for the “political Islam” paradigm of AKP. Thus, the values of national belonging and citizenship paved its way to the concept of Islamic brotherhood to cover the identity of Kurds and Alevis. As a matter of fact, Sunnism was covered behind the Islamic identity and there appeared a resemblance of neo-Ottomanism, or a “union” under the framework of Sunnism. The AKP approach to Alevis was to see them as an “obstacle” and Sunnism was agreed on as an “official sect” in AKP administration. The Alevis’ demands could be heard in combination with urbanization on sociological issues, and the Alevi issue was thus created.

For the Sunni Islamic brotherhood framework of the AKP, Arab countries had a special importance. Foreign Minister Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu mentioned a great power’s assistance to find a periphery in his “Strategic Depth” approach. In the present term of AKP, the United States outshined the EU and this situation did not take place accidentally.

Muslim Brotherhood governments came to power with the so-called Arab Spring and became a strong milestone for Sunni Islamism. These governments were underlined in the context of U.S. President Barack Obama’s experiment in U.S. policies. Following the Islamist attack on the U.S. ambassador to Libya, (Sept. 12, 2012) the experiment’s disclosure is being understood. AKP’s keenness to offer refugees immigration and offering to draw a buffer zone in Syria was opposed even by the U.N. Security Council, and its hegemonic approach on Syrian policies continue to see Turkish Alevis as a threat. The conservative Turkish media started to label Alevi citizens “local Baathists,” thus making them a target. There are strong allegations that the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which is the armed opposition group in Syria, is being trained in Turkey’s refugee camps. Unfortunately, Hatay – a city near the border – has been called the “dark city,” and it is being said that al-Qaeda militants threaten the local Alevi citizens outside the camps. The AKP’s ambition to overthrow al-Assad and to bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power has increased the risk of the Lebanonization of Syria and the fragmentation of the Arab Republic on ethnic and sectarian lines. At the same time, the Kurdish region of Syria is being converted to become an entity within Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government. Political Islam miscalculated that the reason was the Kurdish reality in the region.

On the other hand, a possible Alawite state in the post-Assad era has become a nightmare for AKP officials. The main U.S. approach is about creating an anti-Iran front in the Middle East, but al-Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq are indispensable for Iran. This “influence map” is called a “Shia axis” by the West. So far, AKP’s Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the new Egypt seem to be the pioneers of the Sunni alliance in the region. The aforementioned approach in the context of Sunni foreign policy perceives Alevis as a threat.

Before the Sept. 12, 2010 constitutional referendum, AKP’s partisan media targeted Alevi judges, public prosecutors, and committed to disqualify them with new articles of the constitution. (Hummersledge). Alevi officers from the army. A number of attacks on Alevis and cases of marking Alevi homes is justified by “hate speech” against Alevis in the partisan media.

AKP tangibly reflected the hegemonic codes to alienate Alevis from education, the judiciary, the academic world, daily life, and its foreign policy. Instead of national belonging determining the AKP’s approach, its mission is to the Islamic Ummah and carrying out a subcontractor foreign policy for the Sunni alliance.
Giving up the secular foreign policy and replacing it with an aggressive, interventionist and sectarian approach will damage Turkey’s territorial integrity, social peace, the region’s future, and the EU approach.

The research conducted by various respected research companies shows that the prime minister is alone on the subject of Syria.

There are two important events the last six months that caused relations with Syria to change completely: the first was the downing of the Turkish army jet in Syrian airspace, and the second was the shelling from Syrian forces that fell within the Turkish border. Following the first incident, a significant reaction was registered by the public in social media. Although the Turkish jet was registered in the Syrian territories and invaded Syrian airspace, no fuse traces were seen in the engine views of the wreckage of the plane. The international organizations and other countries simply condemned this event, although it has been a long time since Turkey explained the reports related to its “amendment of the engagement rules” and the report related to “the downing.” Since the event occurred, Turkey’s “hidden” demand of indemnification has been noticed by society in general, and the reactions given in the first days of the event were therefore replaced by cooler behavior.

The second incident that caused the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Syrian policy to gain supporters was undoubtedly the shelling that landed within the Turkish border and the “civilian deaths” that occurred thereof. Despite the immediate “retort” after the event, Bashar al-Assad’s “strategic” apology only increased the pulse of the Turkish public. Reactions saying “No to War” and “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” on the days around the fall of the bomb in the media and the wider public seemed to be effective on AKP officials, as AKP delegates did not exercise a block vote with regard to the cross-border memorandum the party tried to pass. As for the results of public opinion research on AKP’s Syria policies, the explanations of ibrahim Uslu – the general manager of ANAR Research, (the research company working for the AKP government) – are remarkable. In his evaluation, Uslu stresses that the ratio of those who want to have a war with Syria is limited to a small group – between 3 and 5 percent. Moreover, ANAR also stated that while Turkish people generally considered the al-Assad regime to be a bad one oppressing the public, they also tended to see the Syrian people as friends and siblings.

In the research conducted by Mobile Research in 42 cities, in which 6,460 unions participated, 63.7 percent of those polled thought that the Arab Spring experienced in Syria would actually only take Syria to a new colonial order. 48.1 percent of those who said they were AKP voters agreed with this opinion. As it can be clearly seen here, almost half of AKP voters agreed that what was being experienced in Syria could not result in an “independent and prosperous” Syria.

ANDY-AR reached similar results, revealing that 67.1 percent disagreed with the government on Syria, while only 18.3 percent of the community agreed with it. It is certainly necessary to emphasize that this survey took place after the downing of the Turkish jet, which is one of the two diffraction lines mentioned above.

The results obtained from the research made by EDAM – which was selected the 22nd best think tank in the world by means of TNS – were no different from those of other research organizations, only differing in terms of obtaining more detailed findings. While 41.1 percent of the survey participants expressed that they should “not interfere” in Syria, 15.9 percent were of the opinion that “political and diplomatic initiatives should be continued.” The ratio of those who are directly against a military struggle therefore equals 57 percent. Only 11.7 percent of respondents agreed that “direct military intervention should be made in Syria.” Therefore, all results of the public surveys applied to this date indicate that the AKP has been left alone on its Syrian policy.

In the studies on Turkey’s policy with regard to the post-Assad environment, public opinion has given a message that it expects parallel behavior from the AKP.

For example, in the research made by EDAM, the general tendency supported the view that “Turkey should not intervene with and should be objective toward the developments in Syria” The same organization applied the same survey to foreign policy specialists, finding that while those supporting Turkey’s mediation between the conflicting parties was 36 percent, the tendency toward not intervening in developments and staying objective was 26 percent.

Furthermore, those who are anti-war and want the practice of a peaceful Syria policy continue to loudly utter these demands, despite all “games” and negative developments, say: “Stop, we are friends.” In this approach, Turkey’s foreign policy – despite some exceptional events experienced from period to period – is adopting and internalizing a peaceful tradition. The principle of “Peace at home, peace in the world” is highly effective.

In economics literature, the concept of the “middle income trap” has come to the fore of development economics, particularly in light of whether the growth performance shown by China over the last decade will slow down or not in the crisis period. Based on the World Bank’s definition, the countries that fall into the middle income trap are on one hand those whose competitive capacity has weakened in manufacturing standard industrial products against poor countries with low wages, while on the other hand they have difficulty converging with innovation-based developed countries.

Based on the decrease in the fast growth experienced in Turkish economy by the effect of global crisis, discussions on whether Turkey has fallen into the middle income trap have started. However, like Latin American countries, Turkey has also been observed to have been involved in this trap for a long time. Like many Latin American countries, Turkey has not been able to achieve the transition to the status of “high income country,” despite leaving the status of “low income country.” For example, when we examine the growth performance of eight Latin American economies and five Asian economies between the years of 1900-2000, while the economies of Latin American economies failed to change their statuses of middle income countries, five Asian economies moved from the status of “middle income country” to “high income country,” thus escaping the middle income trap. In the same period, Turkey had an economic performance similar to that of Latin America and could not improve its relative status in the world economy.

When we particularly examine the successful achievements of Asian countries, we observe that the most effective factors are the industry, technology and innovation policies applied. Behind the failure of the countries like Turkey, the deficiencies in the application of these policy sets should be sought. Technological deficiencies in the Turkish economy are a fundamental obstacle to sustainable economic growth. Turkey remains very much behind in terms of technological capability and scientific knowledge, skills and human capital accumulation, which are the fundamental elements of competition superiority in high technology, high value-added industries. A new “Industrial Strategy” was introduced by the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology in 2011 so as to solve these structural problems. In this document, Turkey’s target in the long run is described thus: “To be the center of Eurasia in producing high technology goods.” Therefore, the Industrial Strategy document is targeted to bring micro and macro technology policies together and thus perform the transition from industries producing with low technology to industries producing with high technology.

Like many Latin American countries, Turkey has not been able to achieve a transition to the status of “high income country,” despite leaving the status of “low income country.”

All these targets can only be achieved by using successful science and education policies. Turkey will soon be facing the hazard of stumbling into what’s known as the “middle income trap” in economics literature if it fails to ground its economic growth on science and education-based sources. However, while the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government on one hand claims that it has made breakthroughs to take Turkey out of the middle income trap, on the other hand it contributes to moving Turkey away from a modern and science-based social structure by amendments to the education system called “4+4+4” and removing the independence of the scientific institutions such as TUBA (the Turkish Academy of Sciences), TUBITAK (the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey). Unfortunately, it is impossible for Turkey to become a country that can overcome “the trap” by moving away from a secular secondary education system, by abandoning the autonomy of scientific institutions and universities, and with a technological capability level that is in the very last place in terms of R&D as a share of national income among OECD economies.